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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
JUAN RAMON BERBER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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) 
NO. 1 
CANYON COUNTY NO. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
________ ) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
2011-16748 
Juan Ramon Berber asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 457 (Ct. App. April 17, 2014) 
(hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his judgment of 
conviction, is in conflict with this Court's opinions in State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013), 
and State v. Grist, 14 7 Idaho 49 (2009). 1 
1 Mr. Berber continues to maintain that the district court erred when it failed to conduct a 
proper 403 balancing test before admitting "other bad act" evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), 
1 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Juan Ramon Berber was charged, by amended indictment, with lewd conduct 
alleged to have been committed against then-thirteen year old N.M. by way of genital-
to-genital or manual-to-genital contact. (R., pp.106-07.) According to State, the 
incident was believed to have occurred on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-16.) 
Pursuant to I.RE. 404(b), the State sought to present "other bad act" evidence 
consisting entirely of conduct that occurred after the incident for which Mr. Berber was 
charged. In describing the Rule 404(b) evidence, the State explained, "there's all these 
other instances where she [N.M.] talks about, you know, it continued to . And so 
we intend to introduce those." (Tr., p.51, Ls.1 ) That conduct 
genital contact, genital-to-anal contact, oral-to-genital contact, manual-to-genital 
contact" that purportedly occurred both in Idaho and California, all after the incident for 
which Mr. Berber was being prosecuted. (Tr., p.52, L.15 p.55, L.19.) 
Defense counsel objected to the Rule 404(b) evidence, explaining that he didn't 
understand how it could be admissible without "a proper showing of how it's admissible 
or relevant to the actual charge." (Tr., p.214, Ls.1-21.) Ultimately, the district court 
ruled that the Rule 404(b) evidence was admissible because of "the fact that - that 
there are other issues other than propensity that could - that relate to this, I'm going 
to permit it." (Tr., p.225, L.24 - p.226, L.4.) In discussing the balancing test that is 
required under Rule 403, the district court explained that it need not conduct such a test 
in this case "because it's - it's the same individuals." (Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13.) 
but will rely on the arguments set forth in his Appellant's Brief for that claim. He 
respectfully requests that if this Court grants his Petition for Review, it consider all 
claims raised in his Appellant's Brief, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
2 
was 
Throughout the trial, the 
prosecuted was 
made it that incident for which Mr. Berber 
the first incident of alleged conduct, which it bel 
occurred on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-17, p.53, Ls.5-1 p.244, Ls.1 
("But there is going to be one consistent thing that she's always talked about, and that's 
the defendant put his penis inside her vagina, that it hurt, that aftervvards when she went 
to the bathroom, it hurt again."), Tr., p.609, Ls.9-19.) This can best be seen when 
examining the following portion of the State's rebuttal closing argument: 
[Y]ou don't have to find that it happened on a specific date. But I submit to 
you that memory of New Year's, the party she talked about, falling asleep 
on the couch, that there were other people there, that that's consistent 
with Year's. People have people over. is a party. stay 
up People drink. 
You do have to agree on the act. And you have an option. You have 
either manual-to-genital contact[2] or genital-to-genital contact. It not 
have to be both. You've heard that there was genital-to-genital contact. 
And I submit to you that that's the count, the portion of this that you find 
the defendant guilty of. That he put his penis inside her vagina on or 
about New Year's Eve after he'd gained her trust. Moved in with her and 
had her completely away from her father. 
(Tr., p.620, L.20 - p.621, L.10 (emphasis added).) 
Following a jury trial at which other bad act testimony concerning a wide range of 
alleged sexual misconduct, including oral, anal, and vaginal sex occurring in at least two 
2 The record is devoid of any testimony by N.M. that there was any manual-to-genital 
contact. (Tr., p.325, L.25 - p.327, L.11 (describing the New Year's Eve genital-to-
genital contact for which Mr. Berber was charged), p.330, Ls.2-20 (testifying that 
genital-to-genital contact continued to occur bi-weekly), p.330, L.21 - p.338, L.9 
(describing oral-to-genital contact on one occasion while driving from Idaho to 
California), p.338, L.10 - p.340, L.5 (bi-weekly genital-to-genital contact while in 
California), p.340, L.6 - p.344, L.1 (one incident of genital-to-anal contact), p.344, L.1 0 
- p.346, L.25 (describing another incident of oral-to-genital contact in Idaho), p.375, 
Ls.17-18 (denying any contact between Mr. Berber's penis and N.M.'s hand), p.378, 
Ls.4-6 (same), p.383, Ls.18-19 (same), p.394, Ls.14-23 (describing the two incidents of 
oral-to-genital contact).) 
3 
a Mr. was found guilty of lewd conduct for 
the incident to have on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.637, Ls.5-14.) 
Mr. Berber filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.21 ) 
In concluding that the district court's decision to admit subsequent bad act 
evidence over Mr. Berber's objection was appropriate, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
reasoned that it was relevant because "the charged and uncharged conduct was linked 
as part of a course of conduct. Thus, the California conduct was relevant to 
demonstrate that Berber engaged in a common scheme or plan to sexually abuse N.M. 
from December 31, 2008, in Idaho to November 2009 in California." (Opinion at 5 
omitted).) 
4 
ISSUE 
Is the Court of Opinion affirming Berber's conviction in conflict with this 
rt's opinions in Joy and 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Berber's Conviction Conflicts With This 
Court's Opinions In Jov And Grist 
A. Introduction 
In rejecting Mr. Berber's argument that the district court erred by admitting 
irrelevant propensity evidence at his trial, the Court of Appeals engaged in an analysis 
that conflicts with this Court's opinions in State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013), and State v. 
Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009). As such, he respectfully requests that this Court grant his 
Petition for Review, and apply the reasoning underlying Court's opinions in Joy and 
B. The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Berber's Conviction Conflicts With 
This Court's Opinions In Joy And Grist 
In concluding that evidence of subsequent bad acts was properly admitted, the 
Court of Appeals, after acknowledging Grist and Joy, reasoned, 
[E]vidence of the California conduct had a non-propensity purpose as it 
was relevant to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. Moreover, 
N.M.'s testimony of the California conduct allowed the jury to see the full 
picture and put N.M.'s testimony about the charged acts [sic] into context. 
Having knowledge of the full extent of the sexual abuse allowed the jury to 
determine if N.M.'s inconsistencies were a result of trauma from the abuse 
or a result of untruthfulness. Testimony that N.M. continued to live under 
Berber's control after she left Idaho and continued to be sexually abused 
by him was relevant for the jury to determine N.M.'s credibility. By 
allowing testimony of the events that transpired between the Idaho 
conduct and the report of the abuse, the jury was able to assess whether 
N.M. was fabricating her story or telling the truth. Accordingly, evidence of 
the California conduct was relevant for credibility purposes. 
(Opinion at 6.) 
6 
In reaching conclusion that bad was for 
moses of enhancing N.M.'s credibility, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the 
following passage from State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587 (Ct. App. 1 ), 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that in prosecutions for sexual 
molestation of a child, evidence of uncharged incidents of the defendant's 
sexual misconduct with the same victim or with other children is relevant 
to demonstrate the young victim's credibility. State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 
899, 904, 828 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1992); [State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 
745-46, 819 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1991)]. 
Scovell, 136 Idaho at 590, 38 P.3d at 628. In Grist, the Idaho Supreme 
Court narrowed the admission of other bad acts for credibility purposes by 
stating that such evidence is inadmissible when its "probative value is 
entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's 
propensity to in such be!1avior." Grist, 147 Idaho 205 
1190. 
(Opinion at 5-6 (brackets in original).) The key problem with the Court of Appeals' 
analysis is that it relied on one of its own cases that in turn rested on two of this Court's 
cases - Moore and Tolman - the reasoning of which has been effectively disavowed by 
this Court.3 Given the fact that the "theoretical underpinnings" of the quoted passage 
from Scovell were taken from the now-disavowed reasoning in Moore and Tolman, the 
Court of Appeals has impermissibly narrowed this Court's clear holding in Grist. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals completely ignored the first part of the paragraph 
3 Although, in Grist, this Court "decline[d] to overrule Moore and Tolman in their 
entirety," it did "revisit a theoretical underpinning for the introduction of uncharged 
misconduct in cases involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children" and 
"clarif[ied] that the admission of I.RE. 404(b) evidence in a child sex case is subject to 
the same analysis as the admission of such evidence in any other case." Grist, 147 
Idaho at 51. This Court went on to explain, "Any decision from this Court or the Court of 
Appeals that suggests that evidence offered in a case involving an allegation of sexual 
misconduct with a child should be treated differently than any other type of case is no 
longer controlling authority in Idaho's courts." Id. 
7 
from which it quoted - the portion containing this Cou caution as to the use of 
bad establish an alleged victim's credibility, specifically, 
Although we can envision instances in which evidence of uncharged 
misconduct will tend to reinforce the credibility of a witness without 
reliance on the impermissible theory of the defendant's propensity to 
engage in such misconduct, we will not attempt to identify all 
circumstances in which such evidence properly may be admitted. Rather, 
we will identify the instance in which such evidence may not be admitted: 
Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R. 
404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to 
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior. 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54 (emphasis added). 
This Court went on to disavow the very type of logic relied upon by the Court 
Appeals in this specifically in relation to its in Moore, which relied 
the following passage from a law review article, "[A]dmission of corroborative evidence 
serves the dual purpose of reducing the probability that the prosecuting witness is lying, 
while at the same time increasing the probability that the defendant committed the 
crime." Id. (brackets in original) (citations omitted). In rejecting this line of thought, this 
Court explained, "[T]he theoretical underpinning of the admissibility of uncharged 
misconduct for purposes of 'corroboration' as articulated in Moore is indistinguishable 
from admitting such evidence based upon the accused's propensity to engage in such 
behavior based upon his or her past behavior." Id. This Court further explained, 'The 
unstated premise of Moore is simply this: 'If he did it before, he probably did it this time 
as well."' Id. The Court of Appeals' Opinion conflicts with this Court's holding in Grist. 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the subsequent bad acts evidence was 
also relevant and admissible for the non-propensity purpose of demonstrating a 
common scheme or plan is also in conflict with this Court's Opinion in Joy. 
8 
In Joy, this Court considered the trial court's decision to admit of other bad 
of sexual and physical violence alleged to have committed by the 
his wife in a trial for an incident of abuse that purportedly occurred 
months later. In discussing the corroboration by common scheme or plan exception,4 
this Court explained, 
[TJo be admissible under Rule 404(b ), evidence of prior misconduct must 
show more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the 
charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's charged and 
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the 
prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the 
charged offense. 
155 Idaho at P.3d at 285 (emphasis added). 
In light of the holding in Joy, Mr. Berber's Appellant's Brief argues, "In light of the 
fact that the other bad act evidence in Mr. Berber's trial occurred after the conduct for 
which he is charged, it is impossible for the subsequent bad acts to have been part of a 
common scheme or plan to commit the charged act." (Appellant's Brief, p.8 (emphasis 
in original).) 
Because the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case is in conflict with this Court's 
opinions in Joy and Grist, this Court should grant Mr. Berber's Petition for Review, 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial. 
4 This Court has explained that the exceptions for preparation, plan, knowledge, and 
identity "are most frequently grouped together under the rubric of 'common scheme or 
plan."' Grist, 147 Idaho at 54. 
9 
CONCLUSION 
the reasons forth herein, Mr. Berber respectfully requests that this Court 
grant his Petition for Review, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter 
for a new trial. 
DATED this 16th day of June, 2014. 
SPES,~CEt:R J. HAHN 
~-- »'".,, 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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